Safety at Sea 10. 2015

Launch into the unknown

The means of getting off a sinking ship to safety should be in itself, safe, or safer at least than the environment being left behind. As a result, much time has been spent on legislation and testing to try to prevent mishaps.

In UK waters, for example, liferat accidents where bad weather was known to have been a factor have included recently: MSC Napoli (wind force 10-12), Solway Harvester, Swanland, Heather Bloom, Royalist, Spinningdale (wind force 7-9), Onward (rough seas).

However, actual abandons are not the only time when crew, especially, are at risk.

Drills, and even inspections, have also resulted in bad accidents. For example, while alongside Royal Portbury Dock, Bristol, on 7 February 2011, the UK - registered car carried Tombarra1s rescue boat feel approximately 29 m from its davit, killing one of the boat`s four crew members.

The accidents occured when the fall wire parted as the boat was being recovered to stowage during a monthly drill. A report concluded, "The rescue boat`s fall wire failed because an electronic proximity switch, which was intended to stop power to the winch motor as the rescue boat davit neared its stowed position, did not operate. As a reult,the rescue boat was hoisted fully home into its davit and the fall wire became over stressed by the davit winch, which was fitted with a 15/20 kW electric motor." A number of recommendations were made, which have influenced legislatos.

Confusion

Accidents when launching and recovering indicate that serious mistakes are occuring because of equipment failure as well as operator error. When the on-load release system was developed and implemented, for example, numerous different operating systems were constructed without standardisation, which confused operators.

Lives are lost far too often during exercises, according to Captain Hilmar snorrason, principal of the Maritime Safety and Survival Training Centre IGE-SAR. "Even though it is no longer to assign operating crew on board during launching (since the IMO circulated clarification on SOLAS Reg. III/19 in 2009) people are still being killed during the operation of equipment that is there to save their lives".

He said lifeboat drills were best conducted under controlled conditions in a training centre. "Training centres have for years conducted controlled training in the use off all types of lifeboats and are the experts in the use of that equipment."

He warned that under current rules crew members could be at sea for years without participating in a real lifeboat launch and suggested that they should participate in launches during refresher training every five years.

Serving master Captain Kunal Lohar amphasised the role of proper regulations to prevent accidents, "The usual reaction is to put the blame on the operating crew for not having adhered to basic recommendated safety procedures during launch at drills. While this is lagely true, the underlying and basic factor, in my opinion, is the design of the lifeboat release gear, the quality of construction of lifeboat fittings and neglect of long-term maintenance. I mention long-term maintenance to emphasise the need for regulatory authorities to pay more serious attention and at (shorter) intervals."

Lohar is keen on additonal measures to protect lifeboat crew and passengers, "The fear of injury during freefall is paramount. I should like to see the launch of a freefall lifeboat into water to be required about every 2,5 years, carried out by an authorised representative at a safe location, such as while at anchor prior entering drydock/ repair berth".

Amendments to SOLAS (1974) aimed at preventing accidents during lifeboat launches became active on 1 January 2013. "We have come a long way, but there are still lifeboat accidents," said Allan Graveson, senior national secretary of Nautilus International.

Other SOLAS amendments intended to establish new, stricter, safety standards for lifeboat release and retrieval systems, which required the assessment and possible

replacement of a large number of lifeboat release hooks was adopted in May 2011. Lifeboat on-load release mechanisms not complying with new International Life-Saving Appliances (LSA) Code requirements are due to be replaced by l July 2019 at the latest.

The problem was too many hook designs, Graveson explained. "Many were not fit for purpose and as many as 95% of hooks had not undergone vibration testing. They are getting there now, but it has taken nearly a decade."

Graveson observed that under current rules lifeboats can accommodate only 75% of the ship's compliment, with the rest in liferafts, which can overtum or under-inflate and are vulnerable to fire and ice. Liferafts should be an additional capacity, not part of a minimum provision, he argued.

Enclosed lifeboats are especially important in polar regions, providing additional/better provisions and better Communications, especially given that rescue will depend on other vessels in the vicinity coming to

urvivors' assistance when they can. He noted that super-sized passenger vessels, which can catty about 8,000 people, of the equivalent of a large village, require all the support in terms of security, firefighting, medicine, and so as a similar-sized community on shore. He also suggested that more crew should be trained in the lowering of lifeboats beyond the minimum on the muster sheet because in a real emergency the number of trained crew could be reduced by death or injury.

There is also concern about whether the lifeboat at any given moment could withstand water ingress at the depth for which float-free arrangements are designed. For example, if acrylic windows were replaced at sea without matching the original construction standards, could they continue to hold pressure?

Test timing

"A regulation should provide for underwater sustainability of the float-free lifeboat carried out every 2.5 years, coinciding with the vessel's drydock," said Lohar. This ties in with his suggestion of a rešuirement for the launch of a freefall lifeboat in the same timeframe under the same conditions. "The lifeboat must be submerged to the rešuired depth and checked for water ingress. I would like to see introduction of airbags in freefall lifeboats, just as in road vehicles, and inflated ramps for abandoning ship by liferaft, similar to aircraft."

Graveson added that following the loss of Titanic, Lord Mersey recommended that there should be a muster on board prior to setting sail. This recommendation was eventually adopted in its entirety after the Costa Concordia incident, "but it took 101 years to get there", he said. <